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David B. Fischer*

Proposition 65 Warnings at 30 – Time for a
Different Approach

INTRODUCTION
This year, 2016, marks the thirtieth anniversary of Proposition 65 (“Prop
65”), a voter initiative that passed in California under the more imposing name of
the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986.1 Although Prop 65 is
touted for its simplicity and fundamental “right to know” underpinnings, it
continues to raise the ire of businesses both large and small, many of which are
subject to Prop 65’s warning requirements.2 California is awash in Prop 65
warnings, whether on consumer products or in hotels, restaurants, ballparks,
parking garages, office buildings, amusement parks, and pools.3 Governor Brown’s
ambitious legislative efforts to strengthen and restore the original intent of Prop 654
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1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–25259.13 (West 2006).
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Margulies, Court Ruling Reveals Absurdity of California’s Proposition 65, 19 ANDREWS
TOXIC CHEMICALS LITIG. REP., no. 24, Mar. 8, 2002, at 12 (noting the “high cost of performing Prop 65 exposure
assessments” to prove chemical exposure levels are safe). In fact, because such assessments pose a huge burden,
a business that may be in compliance with Prop 65 will “[s]ettle with the plaintiff, of course. Save the cost of the
assessment. Save the legal fees. Get rid of the case.” Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627,
646 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (Vogel, J., dissenting)).
3. Michael L. Marlow, Too Much (Questionable) Information?, REGULATION, Winter 2013–2014, at 22
(describing
the
plethora
of
warnings
conveyed
“by
a
typical
California
hotel.”),
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2014/1/regulation-v36n4-6.pdf.
4. See Marc Lifsher, Brown Seeks to Rewrite Toxics Law, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/08/business/la-fi-prop65-overhaul-20130508 (“Proposition 65 is a good
law that’s helped many people, but it’s being abused by unscrupulous lawyers.”). Political reality converted
Governor Brown’s 2013 ambitious legislative proposals into modest enforcement relief for small businesses,
codified in Section 25249.7(k).
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yielded only limited improvements,5 leaving California’s Office of Environmental
Health Hazard Assessment (“OEHHA”) and Office of the Attorney General to
propose ostensible improvements through the regulatory process.6 OEHHA’s
particular efforts, however, highlight inherent flaws with Prop 65 itself––flaws
beyond the ability of OEHHA to cure through regulation.7
The first part of this article discusses the impetus for Prop 65 and provides an
overview of its crucial, and controversial, features.8 The second part highlights the
fundamental flaws of Prop 65––focusing on consumer product warnings and
bounty hunter provisions––that stubbornly persist notwithstanding recent
legislative and regulatory efforts to address them.9 This article concludes by
discussing alternative approaches to Prop 65.10
I.

THE IMPETUS FOR PROPOSITION 65

11

Proposition 65 was one of over a half-dozen initiatives on the ballot12 in the
November 4, 1986 California general election, and garnered a nearly two-to-one
5. See Melanie Mason, Brown Signs Law Amending State’s Anti-Toxins Law, Proposition 65, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2013, 2:59 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-ln-brown-california-amend-antitoxinslaw-20131005-story.html; Jack Schatz, Proposition 65 Reform Legislation Abandoned by Gov. Brown,
PROP65NEWS.COM (Sept. 9, 2013), http://prop65news.com/Story-Details/ArticleID/7533/Prop-65-ReformLegislation-Abandoned-by-Gov-Brown.
6. See Natalie E. Rainer et al., California Prop 65 Enforcement Amendment Summary re: Office of
Environmental
Health
Hazard
Assessment,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(Oct.
13,
2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-prop-65-enforcement-amendment-summary-re-officeenvironmental-health (“The California Attorney General’s Office recently proposed regulations intended to
reform the private enforcement of Proposition 65. . . . Ultimately the Attorney General’s proposed regulations
will likely increase the costs to defendants in Proposition 65 actions.”).
7. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.12(a) (West 2006) (explicitly confining OEHHA’s
regulatory reach to “conform with” Prop 65 and “to further its purposes”).
8. See infra Part I. This article does not address or propose to modify Section 25249.5 and related sections
of Prop 65 that prohibit toxic discharges into drinking water. The formal title of Prop 65, coupled with Section
25249.5, which precedes the warning provisions, underscore Prop 65’s foremost intent to keep businesses from
discharging toxic chemicals into drinking water. Section 25249.5 states in full that “[n]o person in the course of
doing business shall knowingly discharge or release a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or
reproductive toxicity into water or onto or into land where such chemical passes or probably will pass into any
source of drinking water . . . .” § 25249.5. This Section garnered the attention of the press. The Los Angeles
Times, for example, focused on the drinking water aspect of the provision in recommending that constituents
vote against the initiative. See No on Toxics Initiative, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1986),
http://articles.latimes.com/1986-10-29/local/me-7725_1_drinking-water.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. Drafted by (former) Environmental Defense Fund attorney David Roe, Sierra Club political director
Carl Pope, and Los Angeles Deputy Mayor Tom Houston, Prop 65 was intended to address voter’s “growing
concerns about exposure to toxic chemicals;” a self-styled “populist cure for government’s chronic failures to
control toxic chemicals.” See Paul Jacobs, California Elections: Prop. 65: Toxics Calamity or Legal Catalyst?, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-10-13/news/mn-3020_1_hazardous-chemicals/2; OFFICE
OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PROPOSITION 65 IN PLAIN LANGUAGE (2013) [hereinafter PROP 65 PLAIN
LANGUAGE], http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/background/p65plain.html (last updated Feb. 2013); David Roe,
Little Labs Lost: An Invisible Success Story, 15 GREEN BAG 275, 275 (2012).
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margin of victory.13 Its passage ushered in a dramatically different and deceptively
straightforward approach to addressing the perceived inadequacies of existing
environmental laws.14 Simply put, Prop 65 proponents argued that existing laws
were not “tough enough.”15 Indeed, section 1 of Prop 65 wags the proverbial finger
at “state government agencies” for failing to adequately protect the people of
California from hazardous chemicals.16 Despite vigorous opposition by industry,
agriculture, and editorial boards of numerous newspapers, including the Los
Angeles Times, this emotive message won out.17
In approving Prop 65, voters declared their rights to protect themselves against
chemicals that cause cancer or reproductive harm and to be informed about
exposures to such chemicals.18 The specific provisions of Prop 65, including the

12. See MARCH FONG EU, SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 4, 1986 (U.C. Hastings Scholarship Repository) [hereinafter BALLOT PAMPHLET],
http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props/971/. To assist California voters in assessing the merits of
Prop 65, among other propositions, the Secretary of State assembled and distributed a California Ballot
Pamphlet, which “contains the ballot title, a short summary, the Legislative Analyst’s analysis, the pro and con
arguments and rebuttals, and the complete text of each proposition.” Id. at 2. Each ballot measure is designated
as a proposition and assigned a number. Id. at 3. More generally, Prop 65 is an example of a ballot statutory
initiative, a common legislative vehicle in California, by which the electorate either creates or amends a statute.
L.Tobe Liebert, Researching California Ballot Measures, 90 LAW LIBR. J. 27, 28–29 (1998). This initiative power is
rooted in California’s Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. The arguments for and against a proposition in the
ballot pamphlet constitute the “‘intent’ of the electorate.” Liebert, supra, at 36.
13. See Kenneth W. Kizer et al., Sound Science in the Implementation of Public Policy, 260 JAMA 951, 951
(1988).
14. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 54.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 53. But in raising alarm bells, vocal opponents feared that mandating Prop 65 on “millions of
ordinary and safe items” would serve no useful purpose. Id. at 54. See, e.g., Devin S. Schindler & Tracey Brame,
This Medication May Kill You: Cognitive Overload and Forced Commercial Speech, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 27, 55–57
(2013) (rejecting the government notion that cigarette labels are necessary because people who choose to smoke
lack enough information to make a “truly rational decision,” especially since the addictive and harmful health
effects of cigarettes are so widely disseminated; more information is not always better than less). Ironically, Prop
65 detractors agreed with Prop 65 proponents in arguing that better enforcement of the current plethora of
environmental laws was needed. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 55.
17. See No on Toxics Initiative, supra note 8; Kizer et al., supra note 13, at 951. The dire forewarnings
predicted by the anti-Proposition 65 critics, however, failed to materialize—Prop 65 has neither led to the
banning of ordinary table salt nor warning labels on every apple sold served in California. No on Toxics
Initiative, supra note 8.
18. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 54. Other rights include the right to strict enforcement of laws
controlling hazardous substances and the right to have offenders of illegal hazardous waste disposal bear more
of the costs for cleanups than taxpayers. See id. “Proposition 65 represents the most ambitious attempt by any
state to regulate hazardous chemical exposure through information disclosure rather than by direct mandate.”
Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California’s Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 303, 306 (1996).
As with other voter initiatives, however, it is difficult to say whether the electorate fully grasped and
understood the contours of Prop 65 in casting their vote. See Kizer, supra note 13, at 951.
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controversial “right to know” warning requirements discussed throughout this
article, purportedly advance those rights.19
A.

Overview of Prop 65’s Warning Mandate

Prop 65’s warning mandate provision is a mere one sentence in length: “No person
in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any
individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity
without first giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual, except as
provided in Section 25249.10.”20 Warnings, however, “need not be provided
separately to each exposed individual.”21 And numerous warning methods, such as
the posting of notices, mailings, and labels, may be utilized if the warning provided is
clear and reasonable.22

19. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, (“We each have a right to know, and to make our own choices
about being exposed to these chemicals [that cause cancer or reproductive disorders]”); see also DiPirro v.
Bondo Corp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (referring to Prop 65 as “informational and
preventative rather than compensatory in its nature and function.”). The DiPirro court also noted that
Proposition 65 “facilitate[s] the notification of the public of potentially harmful substances, so informed
decisions may be made by consumers on the basis of disclosure.” Id. at 747–48. As argued, Prop 65 warnings
communicate very little useful information and thus hamper informed decision-making. Prop 65 was not the
only law to embrace right to know provisions. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA), also passed in 1986, contains explicit right to know provisions. See What is EPCRA?, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/epcra/what-epcra (last updated Nov. 10, 2015); Carl Cranor, Information
Generation and Use Under Proposition 65: Model Provisions for Other Postmarket Laws?, 83 IND. L.J. 609, 624
(2008).
20. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (West 2006). Given the brevity of the warning provision, much
was left to the state agency tasked with implementing Prop 65 and to the courts to sort out. The term
“intentionally” is not defined in the statute or regulation. “Knowingly” is defined in the regulations as referring
“only to knowledge of the fact that . . .[an] exposure to a chemical listed . . . is occurring.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
27, § 25102(n) (2016). “Person in the course of doing business” does not include any state or federal agency,
public water system, or “any person employing fewer than 10 employees . . . .” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25249.11(b) (West 2006).
Section 25249.10 delineates three exemptions from the warning requirement: when a warning for an
exposure is preempted by federal law; for an exposure that occurs within 12 months of “the listing of the
chemical in question;” and for “[a]n exposure for which the person responsible can show that the exposure
poses no significant risk . . . .” Id. § 25249.10. See also OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, REVISED
FINAL
STATEMENT
OF
REASONS
32
(1988)
[hereinafter
RFSOR],
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/law/pdf_zip/12601FSORNov1988.pdf (“Unless a business has reason to know
that the product contains a listed chemical, no testing is needed, and no warning is necessary.”).
21. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.11(f) (West 2006). Prop 65 has prompted some manufacturers to
avoid Prop 65 warning requirements through product reformulation—replacing a Prop 65 listed chemical with
a non-listed chemical. Rechtschaffen, supra note 18, at 307, 313, 318, 320 n.83, 341–45. But despite what the
drafters may have intended in drafting Prop 65, the Ballot Pamphlet is devoid of any discussion of product
reformulation as a justification. See generally BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12.
22. See PROP 65 PLAIN LANGUAGE, supra note 11. The term “clear” refers to the warning content—the
message itself; the word “reasonable” refers to the method of warning—how a message is presented or
transmitted. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 2.
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To provide businesses with “reasonable certainty that they will not be subjected
to an enforcement action over the warning[s] they provide,”23 the Health and
Welfare Agency of California (the predecessor of OEHHA)24 promulgated both
“safe harbor” warning methods and content for exposures related to consumer
products, occupational exposures, and environmental exposures.25
Exemptions from the warning requirement include a showing that exposure to a
listed carcinogen poses “no significant risk assuming lifetime exposure at the level
in question,”26 and for a listed reproductive toxicant, a showing that “the exposure
will have no observable effect assuming exposure at one thousand (1,000) times the
level in question.”27 To assist businesses in determining whether a warning is
required, OEHHA promulgated safe harbor levels, known as no significant risk
levels (“NSRLs”) for carcinogens and maximum allowable dose levels (“MADLs”)
for reproductive toxicants.28 But OEHHA’s penchant for listing chemicals has far
surpassed its ability to promulgate safe harbor levels,29 despite pronouncements to
23. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 8. “Normally, whether a warning is clear and reasonable will be a question of
fact to be determined on a case by case basis.” Id. at 7.
24. The Health and Welfare Agency of California was the initial lead agency tasked with implementing
Prop 65; the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) is the current lead agency. OFFICE
OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, TITLE 22 CCR § 12000-14000, PROPOSITION 65 – CHANGES WITHOUT
REGULATORY
EFFECT
–
TITLE
22,
REGULATORY
UPDATE
PROJECT
(2008),
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/law/regs032808.html. Unless otherwise indicated, “OEHHA” is used throughout
this article to refer both to OEHHA and the Health and Welfare Agency of California.
25. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, §§ 25601–25605.2 (2016). For consumer products that contain a
carcinogen, for example, the safe harbor provisions specify that the warning must include the following
language: “WARNING: This product contains a chemical known to the State of California to cause cancer.” Id.
§ 25603.2(a)(1). The warning may be provided on a product’s label or through other means specified in section
25603.1: (a)–(d).
26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c) (West 2006). The burden of showing that a warning is not
required falls on the individual responsible for the exposure in question. Id. For both listed carcinogens and
reproductive toxicants, the level in question is the amount of the exposure to a listed chemical for which “the
person in the course of doing business is responsible.” See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, §§ 25721(a), 25821(a)
(2016). For listed carcinogens, “no significant risk” is defined as the risk level “calculated to result in one excess
case of cancer in an exposed population of 100,000, assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question . . . .” Id.
§ 25703(b).
27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c) (West 2006). If the no observable effect level for a chemical
is 1 milligram per day (mg/day), the level of the chemical in question to which an individual could be exposed
without triggering the warning requirement would be 1 mg/day divided by 1000, or 0.001 mg/day. Id.
28. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, MOST CURRENT PROPOSITION 65 NO SIGNIFICANT RISK
LEVELS
(NSRLS)
MAXIMUM
ALLOWABLE
DOSE
LEVELS
(MADLS)
(2013),
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/getNSRLs.html. See also Roe, supra note 11, at 288 (footnote omitted)
(“[D]efendants need a reliable way of showing what the exemption level is. The only sure way is to point to an
official determination. Numbers fixed by the regulatory agency don’t create liability, in other words; they create
shields against what would otherwise be wider liability.”).
29. Safe harbor levels assist businesses in determining whether a warning is required. If the level of
exposure does not exceed the safe harbor level, then no warning is required. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
25249.6, 25249.10 (West 2006); see, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, arts. 7–8 (2016). In the late 1980s, OEHHA
“provided specific no significant risk levels” and therefore anticipated “that warnings will be necessary in
relatively few cases.” RFSOR, supra note 20, at 27. As of December 2015, of the over 800 chemicals “known to
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“strive to develop . . . a draft safe harbor level within one year of the chemical’s
listing.”30
The Governor was tasked in a separate Prop 65 provision to create a list, updated
at least annually, of chemicals that are known to cause cancer or reproductive
toxicity.31 Various mechanisms for adding chemicals to the list are described in this
provision.32 One mechanism involves a determination rendered by “the state’s
qualified experts”33 who serve on OEHHA’s Science Advisory Board, which is
composed of the Carcinogen Identification Committee (“CIC”) and the
Developmental and Reproductive Toxicant Identification Committee
(“DARTIC”).34 The warning requirements take effect within 12 months of listing
through any of the several mechanisms.35
B.

Enforcement and Burden Shifting

Any person violating or threatening to violate Prop 65’s warning requirements may
be enjoined;36 violators also are subject to civil penalties not to exceed $2,500 per
day for each violation.37 Enforcement of Prop 65’s warning requirements may be
pursued by the California Attorney General, any district attorney, certain city
attorneys, and city prosecutors.38 If none of these individuals “has commenced and
is diligently prosecuting an action against the violation,” then a “private action” by
“any person in the public interest” may be commenced only after 60 days from the
date the person has given notice of the alleged violation to the alleged violator, the
the State [of California] to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity,” approximately 30% have safe harbor levels,
and most of these levels were published before 2002. Less than 20% of the safe harbor levels were published in
the last 10 years. See OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, CHEMICALS KNOWN TO THE STATE TO CAUSE
CANCER OR REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY (2015) [hereinafter CURRENT PROP 65 LIST DECEMBER 2015],
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/prop65_list/files/P65single120415.pdf.
30. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, NOTICE OF NEW PRACTICE REGARDING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSITION 65 SAFE HARBOR LEVELS FOR NEWLY LISTED CHEMICALS (2008),
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/policy_procedure/safeharbor020108.html. In September 2012, OEHHA updated its
“Priority List for the Development of Proposition 65 Safe Harbor Levels” and assigned priority levels to
numerous chemicals for which safe harbor levels had not been adopted. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD
ASSESSMENT, PRIORITY LIST FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSITION 65 SAFE HARBOR LEVELS NO SIGNIFICANT
RISK LEVELS (NSRLS) FOR CARCINOGENS AND MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE DOSE LEVELS (MADLS) FOR CHEMICALS
CAUSING
REPRODUCTIVE
TOXICITY
(2012),
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/state_listing/prioritization_notices/prior083012.html.
OEHHA
anticipated that within two years, safe harbor levels would be proposed for “many of the chemicals in the first
priority group.” Id. As of December 2015, OEHHA has yet to propose, let alone finalize, safe harbor levels for
the vast majority of first priority group chemicals. See CURRENT PROP 65 LIST DECEMBER 2015, supra note 29.
31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8(a) (West 2006).
32. Id. § 25249.8.
33. Id. § 25249.8(b).
34. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25302 (2016).
35. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(b).
36. Id. § 25249.7(a).
37. Id. § 25249.7(b) (West 2006).
38. Id. § 25249.7(c)–(d).
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Attorney General and the prosecutor in whose jurisdiction the violation is alleged to
have occurred.39
The 60-day notice requirement “was intended to trigger agency enforcement,
and to afford the [agency], state, and violator sixty days to resolve the problem
without being harassed by a lawsuit.”40 “[A]ny person” has been euphemized to
“bounty hunter,” and describes persons who have fueled the flames of
consternation among businesses on the receiving end of bounty hunter suits.41 And
the California code statutorily mandates a portion of the civil penalties collected in
these actions be paid to the bounty hunter.42 “Moreover, [Prop 65] does not have a
standing requirement; a plaintiff need not allege or prove damages to maintain an
action . . . .”43
As noted, Prop 65 exempts an exposure to a listed chemical from attendant
warnings if the exposure can be shown to pose no significant risk or observable
effect.44 Prop 65, unlike most environmental and health statutes,45 distinctively
places the “onerous”46 burden of meeting this exemption squarely on the shoulders
of the defendant, not on the party bringing a Prop 65 enforcement action.47 Thus,
the warning exemption serves as “an affirmative defense within that action.”48
II.

PROPOSITION 65 AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

39. Id. § 25249.7(d)(1)–(2).
40. Yeroushalmi v. Miramar Sheraton, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
41. Bounty hunter law suits are “private actions” permitted by Prop 65, which has resulted in a wave of
frivolous lawsuits by these bounty hunters, who often file suit in hopes of eliciting quick settlements.
42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.12(d) (“Twenty-five percent of all civil and criminal penalties . . .
shall be paid” to the bounty hunter bringing the suit).
43. DiPirro v. Bondo Corp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). See also Nat’l Paint & Coatings
Ass’n v. State, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that California’s Constitution, unlike the
U.S. Constitution, “contains no ‘case or controversy’ requirement”).
44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c) (West 2006); see supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text
(explaining exemptions from the warning requirement where it is shown the “listed carcinogen poses ‘no
significant risk’” or in the case of reproductive toxicants, “no observable effect”).
45. Kristen R. Stevens, Regulating Toxics at the State Level: Proposition 65’s Warning Requirement, 9 STAN.
ENVTL. L. J. 84, 123 (1990) (footnote omitted) (“In most environmental and health statutes, the burden falls on
the agency to show that a released chemical is harmful. . . . Proposition 65’s no significant risk exception instead
places the burden of proof on the business to show that the amount of the listed substance released is
harmless . . . .”).
46. DiPirro, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 754. See also Consumer Def. Grp. v. Rental Hous. Indus. Members, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 832, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that “the burden shifting provisions make it virtually impossible
for a private defendant to defend a warning action . . . short of actual trial”).
47. See Consumer Def. Grp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 853 (describing the burden shifting provision of section
25249.10 as “[t]he critical part” of Prop 65).
48. DiPirro, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 749. “The standard of proof required of the defendant to establish the
warning exemption is ‘the preponderance of the evidence standard.’” Id. at 751–52.
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This section analyzes the framework under which First Amendment protection is
afforded to commercial speech and then argues why Prop 65 runs afoul of the First
Amendment. This section concludes by describing the key Prop 65 drivers of
private enforcement.

A.

History of Commercial Speech and First Amendment Scrutiny

1.

Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council

Prop 65’s mandated warning disclosures for consumer product exposures impact
vast stretches of the business community, from the manufacturer to the retailer and
everyone in between. Arrayed against these mandated disclosures, however, are the
commercial speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment that emerged
in the landmark case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,49 in which the United States Supreme Court confronted the question
of “whether speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction,’”50
is “wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment.”51
Under a Virginia statute, a pharmacist who advertised price information on
prescription drugs was guilty of unprofessional conduct.52 The state argued that
advertising prescription drug prices would set in motion a host of maladies,
including driving some pharmacists out of business and diminishing the
professional image of the pharmacist.53 The Court rejected the “highly paternalistic
approach”54 embodied in the Virginia statute, embracing instead an approach in
which “people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them.”55 Advertisements convey information
that benefits the economic interests of the advertiser and the consumer’s interest in
“who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.”56
49. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
50. Id. at 762.
51. Id. at 761 (explaining that commercial speech encompasses advertisements of commercial transactions
between the advertiser and the consumer); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience”). But see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (“More subject to doubt, perhaps, are the precise bounds of the
category of expression that may be termed commercial speech . . . .”).
52. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 752.
53. Id. at 766–68.
54. Id. at 770.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 765.
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Commercial speech, as the Supreme Court held in Virginia Pharmacy, is
protected speech, but to a lesser extent than noncommercial speech.57 “There are
commonsense differences between speech that does ‘no more than propose a
commercial transaction’ and other varieties.”58 Commercial speech embodies
attributes of “greater objectivity and hardiness” and “durab[ility],” and is therefore
more resilient to government regulation.59
2.

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York

Drawing on the teachings of Virginia Pharmacy and its progeny,60 the Court in
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York61 fashioned
a four-prong standard to determine whether the government’s regulation of
commercial speech runs afoul of the First Amendment:62 1) if the commercial
speech sought to be regulated is neither misleading nor pertaining to unlawful
activity, the court asks,63 2) whether the interest asserted by the government is
substantial,64 3) whether the regulation “directly advances the governmental interest
asserted,”65 and 4) “is not more extensive than is necessary66 to serve that interest.”67
57. See J. Wesley Earnhardt, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Opportunity to Define Commercial Speech—Why
Wouldn’t the Supreme Court Finally “Just Do It™”?, 82 N.C.L. REV. 797, 801–02 (2004) (explaining that because
the Constitution affords less protection to commercial speech than to noncommercial speech, governmental
regulation of commercial speech is valid if it passes the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test).
58. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 772 n.24; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“To require a parity
of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a
leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather
than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial
expression.”).
60. See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 453–54 (affirming that a ban on in-person solicitation of non-lawyers
does not violate free speech guarantees under the First Amendment); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
363–64 (1977) (holding that commercial speech does merit First Amendment protection given the important
functions it serves in society, such as providing consumers with information about services and products).
61. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
62. Id. at 566. The Court underscored the vital role of commercial speech in serving not only “the
economic interests of the speaker, but also assist[ing] consumers and further[ing] the societal interest in the
fullest possible dissemination of information.” Id. at 561–62.
63. Id. at 566.
64. Id.
65. Id. A regulation will fail the third prong if “it provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government’s purpose.” Id. at 564; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993) (ruling that Florida’s ban
on CPA solicitation failed to advance the State’s asserted interests “in any direct and material way” because the
restriction in question did not demonstrate “that the harms [the state] recite[d] [we]re real and that [the]
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree”).
66. Despite the use of the word “necessary” in the fourth prong, “not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest” is not synonymous with the “least restrictive means.” See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476–77 (1989). The Court further elaborated that “[w]hat our decisions require is a
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This standard represents an intermediate level of review,68 commensurate with the
subordinate position afforded to commercial speech.69
In Central Hudson, the Court applied its newly forged four-prong standard to
the Public Service Commission’s ban on all advertising that promoted the use of
electricity.70 Although the advertising at issue was neither inaccurate nor related to
unlawful activity, and advanced the substantial governmental interest in energy
conservation, the Court determined that the regulation did not satisfy the fourth
prong.71 The Commission painted with too broad a brush in enacting a
comprehensive ban, and failed to demonstrate that its substantial interest in energy
conservation could not be adequately protected by a more limited measure.72
3.

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio

In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,73 the
Court grappled not only with state prohibitions on commercial speech, to which it
applied the Central Hudson standard, but also state-mandated disclosures.74 The
court noted that First Amendment protection afforded to commercial speech is
predicated “principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech
provides.”75 Thus, mandatory disclosures “trench much more narrowly on an
advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech”76 and do not violate an
advertiser’s First Amendment rights if the disclosures are “reasonably related to the
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”77

‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends—a fit that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in
proportion to the interest served’ . . . .” Id. at 480 (internal citation omitted). See also In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191,
203 (1982) (requiring government restrictions to “be narrowly drawn” and not more extensive than reasonably
necessary); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767 (articulating the fourth prong as “whether the extent of the restriction on
protected speech is in reasonable proportion to the interests served”).
67. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
68. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. See also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635
(1995) (applying intermediate scrutiny—a level “commensurate with the ‘“subordinate position”’ of
commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment values—in upholding the Florida Bar’s restrictions on mail
solicitation of accident victims).
70. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
71. Id. at 569–71.
72. Id. at 571.
73. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
74. See id. at 629, 638.
75. Id. at 651.
76. Id.
77. Id. A lesser standard of review than the Central Hudson standard is commensurate with the minimal
“constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in [] advertising.” Id.
(emphasis in original). The Court also noted in a footnote that disclosure requirements do not need to “get at
all facets of the problem it is designed to ameliorate” and can therefore attack a problem piecemeal. Id. at 652
n.14.
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Applying the “reasonably related” standard, which is less exacting than the
intermediate standard of Central Hudson, the Court in Zauderer upheld the
requirement that attorneys disclose to potential clients their liability for costs, even
though contingent legal fees are not owed “if there is no recovery.”78 The State’s
disclosure requirements passed constitutional muster because they were reasonably
related to the State’s interest in not deceiving potential clients.79 The disclosure
requirements also entailed “purely factual and uncontroversial information,”80 an
“essential feature”81 in the Court’s analysis.
The Supreme Court has never applied Zauderer to disclosure requirements not
designed to correct misleading commercial speech.82 Some lower federal courts,
however, have strayed from Zauderer in applying its “reasonably related” standard
more widely.83 Thus, while Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear that
commercial speech is afforded less protection than noncommercial speech,84 the
dividing line between these two categories of speech remains unclear.85 Nonetheless,

In a more recent case involving bankruptcy and debt relief, the Court applied Zauderer to uphold the
government’s mandated disclosure requirement of accurate statements, which were “intended to combat the
problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements . . . .” Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010).
78. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651–52.
79. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 653 (1985).
80. Id. at 651.
81. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250.
82. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled
by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In Reynolds, “the government could not
seek review under the lenient Zauderer standard absent a showing that the advertisement at issue would mislead
consumers.” Id. at 1214. Disclosure requirements may also take the form of warnings “in order to dissipate the
possibility of consumer confusion or deception.” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. See also Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250.
83. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting that
Zauderer applies not only to mandates aimed at curing deception but to other purposes as well); CTIA-The
Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, No. 15-cv-02529-EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10332, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan 27,
2016) (stating that “Zauderer was not limited to disclosures designed to prevent consumer deception, but
extended to matters of public health and safety”).
84. See, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 636; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980). See also supra notes 57–
59 and accompanying text.
85. The boundary between commercial and noncommercial speech at times proves challenging to
demarcate. Advertisements that propose a commercial transaction readily fall within the bounds of commercial
speech as in Zauderer. This is the same for advertisements of prices. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing the “speech” of advertising prices as “quintessentially
commercial”). Other speech, however, resists the commercial speech label when “it is inextricably intertwined
with otherwise fully protected speech.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). Yet,
intertwined speech is not necessarily “inextricably intertwined.” In Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 474 (1989), “there [wa]s nothing what[so]ever ‘inextricable’ about the noncommercial aspects of
[Tupperware parties].” Commercial speech “that links a product to a current public debate,” does not convert
commercial speech into noncommercial speech, entitled to strict scrutiny. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557 n.5.
Courts may skirt around resolving whether the speech at issue is commercial or noncommercial by assuming
the former and applying the appropriate level of scrutiny. See Int’l Dairy Food Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71
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in subjecting Prop 65 warning provisions to First Amendment scrutiny, this article
focuses on warnings for consumer product exposures and assumes they “relate[]
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience” and therefore
invoke commercial speech protections.86
B.

Warning Requirements Trigger First Amendment Scrutiny

Prop 65 is simply a right to know voter initiative—not a means of preventing
deception.87 “We each have a right to know, and to make our own choices about being
exposed to these chemicals.”88 Armed with the knowledge that a product contains a
listed chemical, Californians can then decide for themselves whether or not to
purchase the product.89 Unlike the disclosures in Zauderer and Milavetz,90 Prop 65
warnings also “do not impart purely factual, accurate, or uncontroversial
information to consumers.”91
Identifying a chemical as “known” to cause cancer or reproductive harm92 is
predicated on a complicated process of scientific review and interpretation of
available animal and human studies, as well as the application of assumptions,93 all

(2d Cir. 1996) (“We need not resolve this controversy at this point; even assuming that the compelled disclosure
is purely commercial speech, appellants have amply demonstrated that the First Amendment is sufficiently
implicated to cause irreparable harm.”).
86. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. The Supreme Court in Central Hudson also noted that commercial
speech “not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers.” Id. As argued in this
article, Prop 65 warnings do neither.
87. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 52.
88. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 43.
89. See id. at 5, 33; BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 54.
90. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 629, 650
(1985) (requiring attorneys to disclose in their advertising certain information regarding fee arrangements and
purely factual and uncontroversial information about terms of service); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States, 559 U.S. 229, 232–34, 250 (2010) (requiring debt relief agencies to identify themselves explicitly
as debt relief agencies and disclose that assistance may involve bankruptcy relief).
91. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled
by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
92. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2006).
93. Perhaps the most glaring assumption is embedded within the exemption from Prop 65 warning
requirements for reproductive toxicants: If the exposure “will have no observable effect, assuming exposure at
one thousand times the level in question,” then no warning is required. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25803(a)
(2016). This 1000× factor is applied in all situations whether or not scientific understanding of a particular
chemical would support a lower factor (e.g., 100×, 10×). The Prop 65 Review Panel, which convened in the
early 1990s, noted that “[t]he mandatory 1,000-fold safety factor for reproductive toxins is scientifically
unjustified.” PROPOSITION 65 REVIEW PANEL, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF ISSUES (1992),
http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EPA_5year.pdf.
OEHHA’s regulations also set forth numerous assumptions to be applied in determining whether a
chemical should be listed and in calculating NSRLs and MADLs. For example, “[t]he absence of a carcinogenic
threshold dose shall be assumed and no-threshold models shall be utilized.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25703(5).
Further, in calculating the level of exposure to chemicals causing cancer, “‘lifetime exposure’ means the
reasonably anticipated rate of exposure for an individual to a given medium of exposure measured over a
lifetime of seventy years.” Id. § 25721(b). Thus, even if consumers only sporadically purchase a consumer good
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of which is fraught with scientific uncertainty, disagreement, and controversy. A
chemical deemed safe by a federal agency, for example, may still be listed under
Prop 65.94 Ultimately, a determination under Prop 65 that a chemical is “known” to
cause cancer or reproductive harm is more akin to a scientific judgment,95 and not
fact. Prop 65 consumer product warnings, therefore, are subject to Central Hudson’s
intermediate scrutiny standard, not the lesser standard of Zauderer.96
bearing a Prop 65 cancer warning, the NSRL for the carcinogen in the consumer good is based on the
assumption that consumers are exposed to the carcinogen over a lifetime of 70 years. See also RFSOR, supra
note 20, at 25 (“As a general rule, it is assumed that a chemical which produces an adverse effect by one route
will produce adverse effects by other routes as well.”).
94. See Sciortino v. Pepsico, 108 F.Supp.3d 780, 786, 805-06 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that even though the
FDA approved caramel for use as a color additive, the approval did not preempt Proposition 65 from deeming
it unsafe). See also Consumer Cause v. SmileCare, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 632, 634 (2001) (stating that while
federal agencies concluded that “dental amalgam is a safe and effective restorative material[,]” dental providers
could still be found liable if they used the amalgam above the levels prohibited in Proposition 65).
In 2015, Dr. Luciana Borio, submitted a letter in response to OEHHA’s request for comments on its
pending listing decision of BPA as a reproductive toxicant under Prop 65. The letter highlighted the findings of
“an extensive, rigorous, and systematic four-year assessment of more than 300 scientific studies on BPA.” Letter
from Dr. Luciana Borio, Acting Chief Scientist for FDA, to Monet Vela, 1 (Apr. 6, 2015),
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/hazard_ident/pdf_zip/BPA_FDA2015.pdf. Based on this assessment, FDA
reaffirmed “that BPA is safe provided it [is] issued in accordance with our regulations.” Id. Regarding
reproductive toxicity, the FDA pointed out relevant and important differences in humans and rodents –
“People process BPA better than rodents; even in rodents, studies have shown that exposure to BPA cannot be
measured in the unborn offspring of pregnant rodents exposed to 100 to 1000 times more BPA than people are
reasonable expected to ingest.” Id.
After receiving public testimony, OEHHA’s Developmental and Reproductive Toxicant Identification
Committee “determined that BPA was clearly shown . . . to cause reproductive toxicity.” OFF. OF ENVTL.
HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, BISPHENOL A LISTED AS KNOWN TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO CAUSE
REPRODUCTIVE
TOXICITY
(2015),
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/list_changes/051115listBPA.html. OEHHA subsequently listed
BPA as a Prop 65 reproductive toxicant. Id.
95. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE
PROCESS 48 (Nat’l Acad. Press 1983) (“Risk assessment [of which hazard identification is a part] is an analytic
process that is firmly based on scientific considerations, but it also requires judgments to be made when the
available information is incomplete. These judgments inevitably draw on both scientific and policy
considerations.”). See also OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, AVAILABILITY OF THE FINAL GUIDANCE
CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING CHEMICALS FOR LISTING AS “KNOWN TO THE STATE TO CAUSE CANCER” (2001),
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/policy_procedure/rev_criteria.html (citing OEHHA’s criteria for the Carcinogen
Identification Committee, which notes that “[t]he application of causation criteria requires scientific
judgment . . . .”). Similarly, OEHHA’s criteria for the Developmental and Reproductive Toxicant Identification
Committee are “not intended . . . to limit its use of best scientific judgment.” OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH
HAZARD ASSESSMENT, CRITERIA FOR RECOMMENDING CHEMICALS FOR LISTING AS “KNOWN TO THE STATE TO
CAUSE
REPRODUCTIVE
TOXICITY”
(1993),
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/policy_procedure/pdf_zip/dartCriteriaNov1993.pdf.
96. But see Proposed Statement of Decision on Trial (Phase One) at 16, Council for Educ. and Research on
Toxics v. Starbucks Corp., No. BC435759 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County June 25, 2015) (applying Zauderer and
concluding that “[a] Proposition 65 warning requirement for the presence of acrylamide passes this ‘reasonably
related’ test for several reasons”). One of the terse reasons for the court’s finding—the warning “that a chemical
known to the state may cause cancer is not false or misleading”—is an inaccurate statement of the warning
language. Id. (emphasis added). The verb “may” does not precede the verb “cause” in any Prop 65 consumer
product warning. As discussed infra, Prop 65 safe harbor warnings misinform rather than inform.
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Central Hudson’s first prong is met because Prop 65 regulates neither misleading
nor unlawful activity.97 Satisfying the second prong hinges on whether the public’s
right to know about potential exposures to certain chemicals in products represents
a substantial interest.98 Prop 65’s right to know interests resemble those of Vermont
in International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy,99 in which Vermont attempted
to mandate the labeling of products from cows treated with growth hormone in
response to “strong consumer interest and the public’s ‘right to know.’”100
Concluding that Vermont “could not justify the statute on the basis of ‘real’
harms,”101 the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision not to grant the
plaintiff’s preliminary injunctive relief.102 “[C]onsumer curiosity alone is not a
strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual
statement.”103 If that were not the case, the Court continued, “there is no end to the
information that states could require manufacturers to disclose.”104
Assuming arguendo that the right to know represents a substantial state interest,
notwithstanding Amestoy, the State of California falters in meeting Central Hudson’s
third prong by not providing “a shred of evidence––much less the ‘substantial
evidence’ required by the [Administrative Procedure Act]”105 that mandated
consumer product warnings directly advance the state’s asserted interest in a

97. See supra text accompanying note 63.
98. See supra text accompanying note 64.
99. 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
100. Id. at 73.
101. Id. at 73. In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., the D.C. Circuit assumed the “FDA’s
interest in reducing smoking rates is substantial,” but in a footnote, the Court voiced skepticism “that the
government can assert a substantial interest in discouraging consumers from purchasing a lawful product, even
one that has been conclusively linked to adverse health consequences.” 696 F.3d 1205, 1218, 1218 n.13 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Court
acknowledged, however, that “the Supreme Court has at least implied that the government could have a
substantial interest in reducing smoking rates because smoking poses ‘perhaps the single most significant threat
to public health in the United States.’” Id. at 1218 n.13.
102. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996).
103. See id. (applying the Central Hudson test). Yet, in Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, the same Court
applied the Zauderer “reasonably related” test to a Vermont statute “that requires manufacturers of some
mercury-containing products to label their products and packaging to inform consumers that the products
contain mercury . . . .” 272 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2001). Although both cases involved mandatory disclosures,
the Second Circuit attempted, albeit unpersuasively, to reconcile the two cases by asserting that the decision in
Amestoy “was expressly limited to cases in which a state disclosure requirement is supported by . . . ‘consumer
curiosity.’” Id. at 115 n.6. The Vermont statute in Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, however, is related to the state’s
interest in reducing mercury pollution. Id. at 116. The Court also feared that striking down the Vermont statute
would expose a myriad of federal and state disclosure requirements, including those of Prop 65 “to searching
scrutiny by unelected courts.” Id.
104. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74.
105. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Both the federal and California Administrative Procedure Acts require
“substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11350(b)(1) (West 2006).
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material way, or “that the harms . . . recite[d] are real and that . . . restriction [of
commercial speech] will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”106
The mandated consumer product warnings––“which must be used in order to
provide a warning deemed clear without further proof”107––confuse rather than
inform108 and “mislead[] consumers and distort[] their consumption decisions.”109
The warnings lack the specificity necessary to ensure that the public receives useful
information about potential exposures and encourage businesses to provide a
warning even when none is required.110 They “focus more on the identification of
potential hazards than on helping consumers develop an understanding of the
magnitude and probability of a potential hazard than can be used for informed
decision making.”111 For listed carcinogens, the safe harbor warnings fail to convey
“that the risk levels involved might be as small as 1 chance in 100,000 [over a
lifetime of exposure].”112 Instead, “the risks are portrayed as being entirely
nonstochastic.”113
Despite assurances that the original 1988 safe harbor warnings would enable
informed choices,114 and “that no alternative considered would be more effective,”115
OEHHA relented in a January 2015 regulatory proposal to revamp the warning

106. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993). Mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice. Id. at 770.
Without Central Hudson’s third prong, California or any other state, “could with ease restrict commercial
speech in the service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a burden on commercial expression.”
Id. at 771.
107. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 24. Safe harbor warning content and method of transmission “provide the
businesses choosing to use them reasonable certainty that they will not be subjected to an enforcement action
over the warning they provide.” Id. at 33. “It is not intended to be a warning straight-jacket.” Id.
108. Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
653, 667 (1993).
109. W. Kip Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD, DRUG,
COSM. L.J. 283, 289 (1988).
110. Rechtschaffen, supra note 18, at 356–57.
111. David W. Stewart & Ingrid M. Martin, Intended and Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages: A
Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 1, 15 (1994).
112. Viscusi, supra note 109, at 291.
113. Id.
114. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 5.
115. Id. at 46.
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requirements.116 “[T]he existing safe harbor warnings lack the specificity necessary
to ensure that the public receives useful information about potential exposures.”117
In November 2015, OEHHA issued a revised regulatory proposal to “further the
‘right-to-know’ purposes” of Prop 65, based on voluminous public comments on
the January 2015 proposal.118 Once again, OEHHA noted that current safe harbor
warnings, rather than advancing the state’s purported right to know interests,
“generate confusion and encourage businesses to provide a warning when none is

116. See OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: TITLE 27, CAL. CODE
REGULATIONS, PROPOSED REPEAL OF ARTICLE 6 AND ADOPTION OF NEW ARTICLE 6, REGULATIONS FOR CLEAR
AND
REASONABLE
WARNINGS
JANUARY
16,
2015
(2015),
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/pdf/Article6_ISOR.pdf. OEHHA acknowledged that
“[t]he public currently has no simple process for obtaining information about the chemical(s) that are present,
whether or how they are actually being exposed to a significant amount of the chemical, how the chemical(s)
may cause harm . . . or ways they can reduce or eliminate these exposures.” Id. at 3.
117. Id. at 1. In January 2015, OEHHA also proposed to create a website that would house supplemental
information on Prop 65 listed chemicals not contained on the safe harbor warnings. The website would serve as
a “one-stop shop for supplemental information concerning the warnings” such that individuals are able “to
make informed decisions about . . . exposures.” OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INITIAL
STATEMENT OF REASONS: TITLE 27, CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULTAIONS, PROPOSED ADOPTION OF ARTICLE 2,
SECTION
25205,
LEAD
AGENCY
WEBSITE
JANUARY
16,
2015,
at
2,
4
(2015),
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/pdf_zip/ISOR_P65WebsiteJan2015.pdf. The website proposal
generated a plethora of public comment, as did the proposed changes to the warning provisions. See OFFICE OF
ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF PUBLIC
HEARING TITLE 27, CAL. CODE OF REG. PROPOSED ADOPTION OF SECTION 25205 PROPOSITION 65 LEAD AGENCY
WEBSITE (2015), http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/NPR_P65WarningWeb.html.
118. See OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF
PUBLIC HEARING TITLE 27, CAL. CODE OF REG. PROPOSED REPEAL OF ARTICLE 6 AND ADOPTION OF NEW ARTICLE 6
–
CLEAR
AND
REASONABLE
WARNINGS
(2015),
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/2NPRArticle112715.html. In support of the
November 2015 proposal, OEHHA contracted with the U.C. Davis Extension Collaboration Center to conduct
a survey of California residents “to assess the effectiveness [defined as helpfulness] of the existing and proposed
warnings.” U.C. DAVIS EXTENSION COLLABORATION CTR., PROPOSITION 65 CLEAR AND REASONABLE WARNING
REGULATIONS
STUDY
1
(2015)
[hereinafter
PROP
65
WARNINGS
SURVEY
RESULTS],
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/pdf/112715ISORAppendixA.pdf.
When asked whether the “old” generic safe harbor warning or the “new” generic safe harbor warning
was more helpful, over 75% of survey respondents chose the “new” warning. Id. at 1, 10. Participants were not
asked to define the term “helpful” or identify those attributes of the “new” warning that they found more
helpful. Unlike the “old” warning, the “new” warning included a warning symbol, the signal word
“WARNING,” and the URL for a website to obtain more information. Id. app. C, at 80–117. But the “new”
warning did not “clearly communicate the risk of exposure to chemical(s).” Id. at 4. The survey did include
questions on proposed specific consumer product warnings, which offered suggestions on how to minimize
exposures. E.g., for passenger vehicles, the warning urges individuals to “avoid breathing exhaust, service your
vehicle in a well-ventilated area and wear gloves or wash your hands frequently when servicing your vehicle.” Id.
at 85. OEHHA did not involve consumers in designing the proposed warnings, even though involving
consumers would “likely . . . increase the probability that a given warning will have its intended effect.” Stewart
& Martin, supra note 111, at 14. OEHHA also failed to “assess potential unintended consequences both within
the target population and other individuals who may be exposed to the warning message.” Id. And in another
survey question, less than 25% of respondents indicated that they were “very likely” to visit the website. PROP 65
WARNINGS SURVEY RESULTS, supra, at 45. Whether they would visit the website before or after purchasing a
product was not discerned. Id. at 71–72. Visiting the website after a product purchase would obviously disenable
individuals from making informed decisions during product purchases.
OF
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required,119 precisely because they are so vague and meaningless.”120 And the
“benefits” of even the proposed safe harbor warnings remain “intangible” and
unquantifiable “in monetary terms.”121 This is not unexpected. After all, Prop 65 is
grounded in providing information to individuals, not in prohibiting or preventing
chemical exposures to curb health effects.122
OEHHA insists that safe harbor warnings are not “a straight-jacket”123 and that
“[b]usinesses may provide whatever warnings they choose” as long as they are clear
and reasonable.124 But OEHHA also acknowledged “reasonable men can differ on
what is clear, and what is reasonable.”125 “Whether a warning is clear and reasonable
will be a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”126 Only safe
harbor warnings are “clear without further proof.”127
Ironically, OEHHA discourages businesses from expounding on the content of
the safe harbor warnings, fearing that additional verbiage on routes of exposure or
degree of risk, for example, “could potentially confuse or mislead the intended
recipients of the warning.”128 Businesses thus find themselves between Scylla and
119. Issuing warnings when none are required constitutes overwarning. See Chris Locke & Sandra A.
Edwards, Proposition 65: The Law that Continues to Cry Wolf, LAW360.com (Mar. 9, 2015, 11:23 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/628706/proposition-65-the-law-that-continues-to-cry-wolf.
120. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: TITLE 27, CAL. CODE OF
REG., PROPOSED REPEAL OF ARTICLE 6 AND ADOPTION OF NEW ARTICLE 6 REGULATIONS FOR CLEAR AND
REASONABLE WARNINGS NOVEMBER 27, 2015, 30 (2015) [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2015 ISOR],
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/pdf/112715WarningReg%20ISOR.pdf.
121. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT – 11/17/2015, at 15
(2015),
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/CRNR_notices/WarningWeb/pdf/112715ISORAppendixB.pdf
[hereinafter Economic Impact Statement]. The costs of the proposal were quantifiable and estimated to range
annually from $15 million to $30 million. Id. at 1. These cost estimates, however, did not include “defending
lawsuits, paying attorney’s fees and penalties, determining the chemical exposures from products, and
reformulating products to avoid the need to provide warnings.” Id. at 3.
122. HIGHLANDS CONSULTING GRP. LLC, OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PROPOSITION 65
WARNINGS
WEBSITE
FEASIBILITY
STUDY
REPORT
18
(2014),
http://www.cio.ca.gov/Government/IT_Policy/IT_Projects/pdf/3980-003_3980-003_OEHHA_P65_FSR.pdf
[hereinafter Prop 65 Warnings Website Feasibility Study Report]. See also Marlow, supra note 3, at
1(concluding that “[l]ittle to no evidence is found indicating that Proposition 65 significantly influences cancer
incidence in California”). According to Marlow, no comprehensive study has been conducted on whether Prop
65 has improved public health. Id. at 22.
123. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 8, 33, 39.
124. Id. at 8. See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25601 (2016).
125. RFSOR, supra note 20, at 7.
126. Id. at 39.
127. Id. at 24. “Since all warnings cannot be clear and reasonable, it is essential for the [safe harbor]
regulations[s] to describe with some specificity the warning methods and messages.” Id. at 26.
128. Id. at 45. Advertisements with Prop 65 warnings therefore stand in stark contrast to the advertisements
in Zauderer and Milavetz, in which the advertisers were not prevented from conveying additional information.
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985). In its November 2015 proposal,
OEHHA forbids any additional information in a warning that would “contradict” the warning message.
NOVEMBER 2015 ISOR, supra note 120, at 12. OEHHA does not define the term “contradict” or provide any
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Charybdis;129 convey meaningless safe harbor warnings that alarm rather than
inform, or embellish them by providing more useful information but risk litigation.
Most businesses opt for Scylla.130 Failing to pass the four-prong Central Hudson
standard, Prop 65 safe harbor warnings for consumer product exposures run afoul
of First Amendment commercial speech protection.

C.

“As Easy as Shooting the Side of a Barn”131

The burden shifting provision of Prop 65, Section 25249.10(c) “make[s] the
instigation of Proposition 65 litigation easy––. . . almost absurdly easy.”132 And “the
burden shifting provisions make it virtually impossible for a private defendant to
defend a warning action . . . short of actual trial.”133 Unsurprisingly, many
businesses elect “the most prudent business decision” and settle with bounty
hunters by paying “any demanded attorney fees and penalties . . . rather than
contesting the case in court.”134
But the pièce de résistance of litigation drivers is another provision of Prop 65––
a portion of the civil penalties collected in bounty hunter actions is to be paid to the
bounty hunters themselves.135 And these penalties are in addition to attorney fees.136
Bounty hunters may also extract payment in lieu of penalties.137 Thus, for many, the

examples of what might constitute contradictory language. Id. at 14–17. Prop 65 bounty hunter consent
judgments may provide for additional warning information. Id. at 35–36, nn.38–40, 42.
129. Scylla and Charybdis, 10 NEW ENCYCLOPŒDIA BRITANNICA 576 (15th ed. 1993). In essence, caught
between two equally unpleasant alternatives.
130. See RFSOR, supra note 20, at 7, 33; Rechtschaffen, supra note 18, at 325.
131. Consumer Def. Grp. v. Rental Hous. Indus. Members, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
132. Id. at 853. The court illustrated via an example of “just how simple it is for a hypothetical unemployed
lawyer, eager to cash in on Proposition 65, to extract money from business using the [Prop 65] initiative.” Id. at
854.
133. Id. at 853.
134. Anthony T. Caso, Bounty Hunters and the Public Interest—A Study of California Proposition 65, 13 J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 68, 69 (2012).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 3200–3204 (2016). “In many private-party cases the parties allocate all
or nearly all of the penalty payment as a ‘payment in lieu of penalties’ – often to the group bringing the case –
instead of treating it as a civil penalty.” Letter from Harrison M. Pollak, Deputy Attorney Gen., Office of
Attorney Gen., State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, to Proposition 65 Private Plaintiffs and Counsel 1 (Dec. 22, 2010),
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/prop65/payment_letter.pdf.
Section 25249.12(c) specifies that the state is to receive 75% of all civil and criminal penalties, as a
means of supporting Prop 65 implementation. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.12(c) (West 2006).
“Payment in lieu of penalties” – not explicitly authorized by Prop 65 – therefore siphons off monies to private
parties or organizations that would otherwise be allocated to the state. Caso, supra note 134, at 72–74. From
2000 to 2010, Mateel Environmental Justice Foundation collected nearly $7 million in payments in lieu of
penalties. Id. at 71. The Center for Environmental Health, another bounty hunter, faired comparably. Id.
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“bonanza for private lawyers” foreseen by those arguing against Prop 65 in 1986 has
come to fruition.138
In 2001, the California legislature, “prompted by a concern that private enforcers
were abusing Proposition 65 by filing meritless lawsuits,”139 amended the statute
requiring bounty hunters to include, along with the 60-day notice, a certificate of
merit (“CoM”). The CoM affirms that “the person executing the certificate believes
there is a reasonable and meritorious case for private action” only after
“consult[ing] with one or more persons with relevant and appropriate experience
or expertise who has reviewed the facts . . . regarding the exposure to the listed
chemical.”140 The CoM may have been engineered to “operate[] as a brake on
improvident citizen enforcement.”141 In reality, however, filing a CoM may be as
easy as a “phone call to your friendly professor.”142 The brakes may be applied by a
court only after litigation has commenced and after the defendant has expended
significant resources.143
III. TIME FOR PROPOSITION 65 TO GIVE WAY TO A DIFFERENT
APPROACH

On September 25, 2015, California’s Office of the Attorney General proposed amendments to the
regulations that govern Prop 65 private enforcement actions. OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 11, DIVISION 4, CHAPTER 1, at 1 (2015),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/prop65/prop-65-nopr.pdf. One of the objectives of the proposed
rulemaking is “to ensure that the State in fact receives the civil penalty funds contemplated by the Proposition
65 statute.” Id. at 3.
Instead of eliminating payments in lieu of penalties altogether, the Attorney General proposed only to
cap the amount, despite acknowledging that the private bar is diverting “large amounts of what should be
statutory penalty payments to Additional Settlement Payments.” OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, DIVISION 4-PROPOSITION 65 PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT, REVISION OF
CHAPTERS
1
AND
3,
TITLE
11,
CAL.
CODE
OF
REG.
1–2
(2015),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/prop65/prop-65-isor.pdf. “[A]ny agreement to forgo all or a portion
of this penalty runs the risk of defeating the voters’ intention that penalty funds be used ‘to implement and
administer’ Proposition 65.” Id. at 5.
138. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 12, at 55. “Proposition 65 creates a lawyer’s paradise: anyone can
sue; almost anyone can be sued. People who sue will get a reward from penalties collected.” Id.
139. DiPirro v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
140. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7(d)(1) (West 2006). See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 3100–
3103 (2016).
141. Sciortino v. Pepsico, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 780, 788 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
142. Consumer Def. Grp. v. Rental Hous. Indus. Members, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
143. See, e.g., Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication Granted, Pub. Interest All. LLC v. Access Bus.
Grp., LLC, No. RG13697992 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County July 10, 2015) (dismissing the case against
defendants because “Plaintiff’s COM was based upon . . . ‘probabilistic conjecture’” and “not supported by a
credible factual basis”); Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334,
346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding the plaintiff’s “notice and certificate of merit were not supported by
facts”).
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The inherent flaws of Prop 65, discussed in Part II, linger, unfettered by legislative
and regulatory reform efforts. If “[m]any Californians dismiss the warnings as silly
and trivial,”144 then Prop 65 has failed to “enable Californians to make informed
decisions about products they purchase.”145 After 30 years, it is time to ask whether
the ubiquitous Prop 65 consumer warnings should remain a steadfast feature of
California law, or whether they should be sunset to give way to a different
approach.146
Mandatory Prop 65 warnings are not the only means of dispensing information
to consumers, nor are warnings necessarily “the optimal or even appropriate means
for ensuring an informed consumer.”147 Manufacturers increasingly offer “green”
products with ecolabels and environmental claims148 in response to consumers’
burgeoning demand for “green” products.149 Indeed, the shift toward “green” has
been described as the “new normal” for the majority of American adult
consumers.150

144. PROPOSITION 65 WARNINGS WEBSITE FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT, supra note 122, at 13.
145. ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT – 11/17/2015, supra note 121, at 14.
146. See Mark Snyder, Proposition 65 Can Spell Bankruptcy for Many California Small Businesses,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Nov.
16,
2014
4:00
PM),
http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/oped/soapbox/article3941246.html. Rather than focusing only on the warning requirements for consumer
products exposures, a more comprehensive approach could entail eliminating: the mandatory 1000 fold factor
in section 25249.10(c); bounty hunter provisions (or at least the ability to obtain bounty hunter penalties);
payments in lieu of penalties; and the burden shifting provision. A revised Prop 65 also would not list any
chemical that has been deemed safe by a federal agency. Warnings, (including those for consumer products
exposures) would be used sparingly and only if warranted by the level of risk that constitutes a legitimate public
health concern. But both approaches assume there is still a need for Prop 65-type legislation. Prop 65 emerged
out of a climate of frustration that state agencies were not doing enough to enforce environmental laws and
protect the citizenry from hazardous substances. It is unclear whether this climate persists or if Prop 65, as
currently drafted, would overwhelmingly pass again. A voter initiative—a formidable endeavor—to proffer
these or similar approaches may be the only remaining option, given the lack of legislative success in amending
Prop 65.
147. Stewart & Martin, supra note 111, at 15. In the absence of mandatory Prop 65 warnings, product
liability law still requires that manufacturers warn consumers about risks of injury from products (unless those
risks are obvious). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 1 § 2 cmt. i. (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
If mandatory state warnings of the Prop 65 ilk were the preferred modality, it is reasonable to expect that other
jurisdictions would have adopted similar approaches. But in 30 years, “no comparable federal law or law in any
other state . . . requires businesses to proactively warn individuals of exposures to substances appearing on a
large chemical list.” PROP 65 WARNINGS WEBSITE FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT, supra note 122 at 16.
148. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has issued “Guides for the use of Environmental Marketing
Claims” which “help marketers avoid making environmental marketing claims that are unfair or deceptive
under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45.” 16 C.F.R. § 260.1 (2012). See also UL, UNDERSTANDING THE
EFFECTIVE
USE
OF
GREEN
PRODUCT
LABELS
(2013),
http://library.ul.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/40/2015/02/UL_Final_Looking-Behind-Product-Environmental-Claims_v8-HR.pdf.
149. UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTIVE USE OF GREEN PRODUCT LABELS, supra note 148, at 8. The term “green”
as used in Understanding the Effective Use of Green Product Labels, “includes all types of product marketing,
ranging from a manufacturer’s own label to claims of third-party certifications and verifications.” Id. at 9 n.2.
150. Id. at 2.
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Manufacturers, consequently, face increased pressure from retailers to use
chemical assessment tools to analyze the chemical ingredients of their products.151
The application of these tools “directly translate[s] into the availability of the
products on shelves and, by extension, the ultimate viability of those products in
the marketplace.”152
Chemical assessment tools also play a role in fostering the development of
voluntary ecolabels,153 which number in the hundreds.154 Ecolabels inform
consumers’ purchasing decisions by distinguishing environmental attributes of a
myriad of consumer products.155 Through the use of ecolabels, businesses seek to
obtain “a market advantage for taking environmental factors into consideration
throughout their supply chains. [Businesses] know their customers want this and
they seek to provide it for them.”156
Voluntary ingredient disclosures offer another approach to informing
consumers.157 In 2010, for example, the American Cleaning Institute, Consumer
Specialty Products Association, and the Canadian Consumer Specialty Products
Association launched a disclosure initiative for intentionally added ingredients in
air care products, automotive products, cleaning products, and polishes and floor
maintenance products.158 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Design for
the Environment program (“Safer Choice”) began requiring full ingredient
disclosure as an element of its cleaning product certification in 2011.159 Over 2000
products carry the Safer Choice label.160 Recently, Wal-Mart announced that it will

151. See Alison M Gauthier et al., Chemical Assessment State of the Science: Evaluation of 32 Decision-Support
Tools Used to Screen and Prioritize Chemicals, 11 INTEGRATED ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 242, 242 (2015)
(examining 32 chemical characterization tools out of 100 identified, and noting there is room for improvement
if the ultimate goal is to accurately reflect potential chemical risk). Only a few of the tools characterized risk. Id.
152. Id. at 254.
153. See id. at 253; CORP. SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE, NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y SOLS., DUKE UNIV.,
AN OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, at 14 (2010),
https://center.sustainability.duke.edu/sites/default/files/documents/ecolabelsreport.pdf.
154. AN OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, supra
note 153, at 10.
155. Id. at 14. In contrast to “green” symbols or claims, an ecolabel is given to products that have met
specific environmental criteria. Id. at 14.
156. Id. at 10.
157. Ingredient disclosure alone does not convey health or safety information and thus does not enable
informed risk based decision making. Disclosing generic chemical names rather than chemical specific names
can serve as a means of protecting trade secrets.
158. Ingredient
Communication
FAQs,
AM.
CLEANING
INST.,
http://www.cleaninginstitute.org/policy/ingredient_communication_faqs.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
159. ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
EPA’S
SAFER
CHOICE
STANDARD
7
(2015),
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-12/documents/standard-for-safer-products.pdf.
160. ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
LEARN
ABOUT
THE
SAFER
CHOICE
LABEL
(2016),
http://www.epa.gov/saferchoice/learn-about-safer-choice-label.

Vol. 11, No. 2 2016

151

FISCHER (5.25.16)3 (DO NOT DELETE)

5/25/2016 10:50 AM

Proposition 65 Warnings at 30
require online ingredient disclosure for household cleaning, personal care, and
beauty and cosmetic products as of 2015.161
IV. CONCLUSION
There are undoubtedly other approaches that could serve to redress Prop 65’s
warnings and its other infirmities. Until that occurs, Prop 65’s fundamental flaws
remain unaltered, bounty hunters continue to thrive, benefits remain elusive, and
the costs on businesses, consumers, and taxpayers continue to mount.162

161. Policy
on
Sustainable
Chemistry
in
Consumables,
WALMART,
http://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/0b/84/abcc4b9d43449714cee2c15abbe2/policy-on-sustainable-chemistry-inconsumables.pdf (last updated Feb. 21, 2014).
162. Marlow, supra note 3, at 28.
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